The Ethics of Belief: A Timeless Debate

The ethics of belief revolves around the moral implications of holding beliefs in the absence of robust evidence or when such beliefs contradict existing evidence. This discourse intertwines two philosophical domains—ethics and epistemology. In contemporary debates, the conversation has been shaped by two pivotal essays: William K. Clifford's "The Ethics of Belief" and William James's counter-argument advocating for the "will to believe."

Clifford's 1877 essay strongly asserted that believing anything without sufficient evidence is inherently wrong. Conversely, in 1896, James argued that under certain conditions, such as belief in God, it may even be necessary to adopt a belief despite a lack of evidence, as such beliefs can significantly influence one's behavior.

J.P.F. Wynne, in his analysis within the collection Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, posits that Cicero's views predate Clifford's by nearly two millennia. To understand this claim, we must delve into Cicero's philosophical alignment with the New or Skeptical Academy, a branch of Plato’s teachings that spanned from around 266 BCE to 90 BCE.

Cicero's Skeptical Philosophy

In his work Academica, Cicero recounts the history of the Skeptical Academy. While one might assume he endorsed the skepticism taught by his mentor, Philo of Larissa, who believed in the validity of "assent," Cicero's stance aligns more closely with that of Carneades and Clitomachus. They argued against any form of assent, suggesting that it leads to dogmatism and hinders open inquiry.

Cicero posited that if we never assent to anything, we still need to navigate decisions based on what seems plausible, informed by the best available evidence and reasoning. He articulates this idea clearly:

“What keeps somebody from acting, who follows things plausible, so long as nothing impedes him?” (Academica, II.108)

Cicero introduces the term "verisimilitudo," or "truth likeness," not as a measure of proximity to truth but as a representation of what appears to be true based on sensory experience or compelling arguments.

The Distinction Between Assent and Truth-Likeness

Cicero further clarifies the distinction between Philo's idea of assent and his own concept of judging truth-likeness through a dialogue featuring Lucius Licinius Lucullus. He explains that to assent is to become inflexible and dogmatic, unable to be swayed by evidence or reasoning.

Cicero asserts:

“...nothing is of such a sort that, should I assent to it, I would not often assent to something false, since truths are distinguished from falsehoods by no mark, especially since there are no criteria of logic.” (Academica II.141)

For Cicero, the pursuit of truth holds intrinsic value, a theme echoed in both his and Clifford’s philosophies, emphasizing that:

“The search for and inquiry into the truth, above all, are proper to humanity.” (De Officiis I.13)

Rejecting James's Perspective

I align with Cicero and Clifford's perspectives, finding James's view problematic. The widespread acceptance of James's "will to believe" has contributed to a societal landscape filled with misinformation and subjective truths, where individuals assert beliefs based on comfort rather than evidence.

Cicero warns against this dangerous trend, advocating for a commitment to plausibility based on evidence:

“We live for the day. We say whatever strikes our minds as plausible. Thus only we are free.” (Tusculan Disputations, V.33)

In this framework, true freedom stems from a commitment to plausible beliefs grounded in careful consideration of available evidence, coupled with the willingness to revise one's views.

Continuing the Discussion on Cicero and Ethics

In the video "Parallel / Plutarch Lives - Demosthenes, Cicero, Alexander, Julius Caesar," viewers can explore the lives and philosophies of key figures, including Cicero’s stance on ethics and belief.